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On the Foundation of Rights to Political Self-Determination: Secession, Nonintervention, and Democratic Governance
Almost two decades ago, the relatively peaceful breakup of the Soviet Union, the
much more violent disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the near success of the secessionist
movement in Quebec led to an outpouring of philosophical work on the justifiability of
secession.1 Though this topic no longer garners as much attention from either the media
or political philosophers as it once did, many people around the world continue to view
secession as an issue of critical importance. Evidence of this can be found in the current
standoff over the final status of Kosovo, resurgent efforts by the Tamil Tigers to carve an
independent homeland out of Sri Lanka, fear and anticipation of southern Sudan’s
eventual bid to secede from Sudan, and concern over the possibility of Kurdish secession
from Iraq, Turkey, and/or Iran. In light of its enduring political importance, secession
remains a topic worthy of careful consideration by political philosophers.2
From a justificatory standpoint, perhaps the most basic question with respect to
secession is what, if anything, provides the moral foundation for a group’s right to
secede. My aim here is to make a start to answering this question. I do so, however, by
considering a different, albeit closely related, question, namely what is the nature of the
wrong done to members of a qualified group denied secession by the state that currently
rules them? A compelling answer to this latter question, I suggest, will contribute
significantly to a satisfactory answer of the former one.3
Christopher Heath Wellman has recently argued that the denial of a qualified
group’s right to secede constitutes a failure to respect that group’s autonomy (or selfdetermination).4 Though I agree with much of what Wellman says in his excellent book,

1

A Theory of Secession, I find problematic his attempt to use the value of group autonomy
as the foundation for a theory of secession, as well as other rights to political selfdetermination. Consequently, in this paper I defend an alternative justification for such
rights, including not only the right to secession, but also the right to non-intervention
(including freedom from colonization and forcible annexation, as well as temporary
occupation), and the right to democratic governance, that appeals instead to individual
autonomy. Though not without problems I cannot fully address here, I defend the
superiority of this account over Wellman’s, which as I argue below, encounters serious
difficulties.
I begin in section I by criticizing Wellman’s argument that agents can be owed
respect in virtue of their accomplishments or because of the roles they occupy, and it is
the failure to extend to them the respect due on these grounds that constitutes the wrong
done to a group’s members when they are denied the right to secede. Instead, I argue that
the denial of this right (and other rights to political self-determination) to a particular
group wrongs its members because it violates certain of their individual rights.
Specifically, I contend in section II that the rights to secession and to non-intervention
ought to be understood in terms of individuals’ exercise of their right to freedom of
association – or in this case, their right not to associate with certain others. I maintain
that persons enjoy such a right in virtue of their status as autonomous agents. Wellman,
however, argues specifically against the attempt to justify secession and other rights to
political self-determination by appeal to individual autonomy. In section III, I consider
these arguments, and contend that they do not undermine my defense of the rights to
secession and non-intervention as one way in which certain individuals may collectively
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exercise their individual rights to freedom of association. Because I defend a plebiscitary
right to secession, however, my attempt to defend the right to secession entirely in terms
of respect for individual autonomy depends ultimately on the defense of an individual
right to democratic governance.5 I sketch an argument for such a right in section IV, and
argue that despite some potential difficulties with this account, it provides an intuitively
more compelling account of the right to democratic governance than does Wellman’s
defense of this right in terms of respect for group autonomy.
Before proceeding to these arguments, I note two substantive assumptions and
two definitions that will be important for what follows. First, the object of discussion in
this paper is a deontological justification for secession and other rights to political selfdetermination. Though in some cases these rights may also be morally justified on
instrumental and/or consequentialist grounds, both Wellman and I aim to defend these
rights as non-instrumentally justified entitlements held by groups or individuals.6 The
impetus for mounting such a defense of secession and other rights to political selfdetermination is the intuition that consequentialist considerations do not fully capture the
wrong done when certain group are denied secession, colonized, or forcibly annexed. For
example, even if the breakup of Czechoslovakia led to a reduction in the welfare of both
Czechs and Slovaks, this does not strike me as providing a reason to deny Slovakia’s
secession, at least as long as members of both the newly created Czech Republic and
Slovakia enjoyed their basic moral rights. Nor do I believe that Canada is morally
entitled to forcibly annex the United States, even though I also believe that were Canada
to do so the effect on the welfare of many Americans would be positive – enough,
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perhaps, for Canada’s forcible annexation to produce an increase in both aggregate and
average welfare.
Second, I will assume the truth of Wellman’s samaritan defense of political
legitimacy. Samaritanism is the view that as long as the cost is reasonable, agents can be
morally required to benefit others even in the absence of consent, a special relationship,
or responsibility for the harm others stand to suffer. Insofar as the state – a territorially
defined coercive order – is necessary to protect individual’s rights and secure peace (i.e.
to save its subjects from the state of nature), samaritanism entails that individuals have no
claim to be free from political coercion. In short, political legitimacy follows from
samaritanism together with the empirical necessity of the state.7 A legitimate state, as I
will understand it in this paper, is one that enjoys a liberty-right vis-à-vis its subjects to
enact, apply, and enforce the law. Finally, by a ‘qualified group’ I will mean any group
that is: (a) willing and able to perform those functions that legitimate the state and (b)
whose secession does not undermine the ability of the remnant state to perform these
same functions. Only qualified groups enjoy a right to secession and the other rights to
political self-determination.8
The moral rights defended in this paper are prima facie ones, meaning that other
considerations may entail that these rights can be justifiably limited or overridden in
certain cases. For example, “supreme emergency” in time of war, natural disaster, or
public health risk may warrant temporary suspension of democratic governance.
Likewise, the effects that institutionalizing the right to secede may have on political
stability may justify enacting a legal right to secede that is narrower in scope than the
moral right to secession defended in this paper. I do not claim, therefore, to address here
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all of the morally relevant issues surrounding secession, non-intervention, and democratic
self-governance. Nevertheless, a successful defense of a deontological account of these
rights will make a difference to debates over issues like those just mentioned; for
instance, by ruling out certain sorts of considerations, such as economic efficiency, as
reasons in themselves for limiting the legal right to secession.
I
Wellman argues that if the value of group autonomy is to entail a set of
deontological rights to political self-determination, then it cannot be understood as either
the extension of individual autonomy to groups, or as merely instrumentally valuable to
the promotion of individual welfare.9 Moreover, Wellman finds suspect the suggestion
that group autonomy has the same kind of non-derivative, ultimate, value that he assigns
to individual autonomy; that is, he rejects value-collectivism in favor of valueindividualism.10 Nevertheless, he contends that the violation of a group’s right to
secession (freedom from colonization, etc.) wrongfully disrespects the individual
members of that group. Agents can be owed respect in virtue of their accomplishments
or because of the roles they occupy, and it is the failure to extend to them the respect due
on these grounds that constitutes the wrong done to a qualified group’s members when
they are denied the exercise of their right to secede. Unfortunately for Wellman, neither
of these bases for respect provides a plausible explanation of the wrong done to these
individuals.
One way in which a person can disrespect another involves a failure to grant her
the recognition due to her in light of her accomplishments. For example, Wellman writes
that a student who challenges Amartya Sen regarding his work on famine, and does so in
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a familiar manner though she has no previous relationship with him, disrespects Sen
because she does not “exhibit the type of deference to which Sen is entitled because of
his remarkable accomplishments.”11 Similarly, the failure to respect the rights to political
self-determination of a group willing and able to perform the functions of a legitimate
state exhibits a failure to grant them the recognition to which they are entitled in light of
their accomplishing those tasks.
This line of argument fails because it substitutes a different sense of respect for
the one necessary to defend a deontological right to collective self-determination. The
student treats Sen rudely – that is the relevant antonym to ‘respectfully’ in Wellman’s
example. Yet while treating someone rudely displays a character fault for which a person
may be justifiably criticized, by itself rude treatment of another does not count as
wronging him. The student acts inconsiderately, and perhaps pompously (who is she to
challenge a Nobel Prize winner in such familiar terms?), but not immorally. Insofar as
we think that denying a group’s rights to political self-determination does not merely
evidence inconsiderateness but constitutes a wrong done to the members of the group, we
cannot understand the disrespect done to them in terms of a failure to recognize the
group’s accomplishments.
Moreover, Wellman claims that a group ought to enjoy self-determination even if
it makes very poor choices about its political order, as long as this does not result in a
failure to fulfill those functions that justify the state.12 It seems possible, therefore, for
there to be a group whose rights to political self-determination we ought to respect
(meaning ‘not violate’), but that has accomplished very little that is worthy of respect
(meaning ‘worthy of honor or esteem’). That is, we might think that in light of the
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group’s poor choices, the group does not merit our adoption of a certain attitude toward
them, one that we express through compliance with various social norms commonly
understood to convey this attitude. Yet we might still believe that we ought not to act in
certain ways that would violate their right to secession, non-intervention, or democratic
governance.
Nor is it always the case that a group warrants respect merely for having
accomplished those tasks that legitimate the state. In Sen’s case, respect is due to him for
his “remarkable accomplishments.” While in some cases a group’s accomplishing those
tasks that justify the state may be remarkable (say if local environmental problems make
this difficult to do), this is not so for all groups (or states).13 However, Wellman aims to
demonstrate why we must respect the rights to political self-determination of all qualified
groups, not merely those that succeed against long odds in creating or maintaining
legitimate states. I conclude, therefore, that the idea of respect due to an individual in
light of her group’s accomplishments cannot explain why the denial of a group’s political
self-determination wrongs the individual members of that group.
Wellman’s second attempt to explain how disregard for a qualified group’s rights
to political self-determination disrespects the group’s members rests on the claim that
certain people are owed respect in virtue of the roles they occupy, conditional upon their
competent performance of those roles. Thus a teacher who imposes her own decisions
regarding the kind of milk her students should drink, rather than deferring to a mother’s
reasonable decisions, disrespects the “authority to which the mother is entitled in virtue
of her satisfactory care for her child.”14 Likewise, the failure to recognize a right to
political self-determination on the part of a group willing and able to fulfill the functions
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that justify the state constitutes a denial of their authority to govern themselves in virtue
of their satisfactory accomplishment of these tasks.
Unfortunately, this line of argument is incomplete. The problem is that Wellman
provides no justification for treating a mother’s authority over her child – her right to
raise her child – as the default moral position. Why should we accept this claim, rather
than, say, the view that assigning mothers primary responsibility for raising their own
children is justified instrumentally, on the grounds that doing so is the best mechanism
overall for seeing to it that children develop as autonomous beings, or for promoting
aggregate welfare?15 I do not believe that this instrumental argument provides the correct
analysis of a mother’s right to raise her child, an intuition Wellman likely shares. Rather,
I suspect that a successful defense of a mother’s deontological right to raise her child will
require an appeal to the treatment the mother is due as an autonomous agent. It is the
mother’s status as such a creature, one whose choices ought to be respected as long as
they do not conflict with her natural duties to others, that accounts for the mother’s
freedom to control her child’s upbringing, even when intervention by others would
provide a greater benefit to the child. Wellman, however, does not think it possible to
justify a group’s right to political self-determination by appeal to respect for its members’
individual autonomy. As I explain more fully below, he argues that group autonomy can
only be an extension of individual autonomy when agents voluntarily choose to join and
remain a member of the group – and this condition is not met for most people vis-à-vis
the state of which they are subjects. If my suspicion regarding what justifies respect for a
competent mother’s authority over her child is correct, then given Wellman’s belief that
most group’s rights to political self-determination cannot be grounded in individual
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autonomy, he will be unable to successfully complete his role-based analysis of the
wrong done to members of a group denied secession.16 I conclude, therefore, that
Wellman fails to provide a compelling account of the nature of the wrong done to
members of a qualified group denied the exercise of their right to secession.
II
In the remainder of this paper, I offer an alternative foundation for a group’s
rights to political self-determination. I begin in this section with a defense of the rights to
secession and to non-intervention, arguing that disregard for a qualified group’s exercise
of these rights wrongs the group members individually because it violates their individual
rights to freedom of association.
Like Wellman, I contend that only a qualified group can exercise the right to
secession, but that the refusal to permit such a group to secede wrongs the individual
members who comprise it. But whereas Wellman attributes the right to the group, and so
cannot explain the wrong done to the group’s members in terms of the violation of
individual rights, I suggest that the right to secession is nothing more than one way in
which agents may exercise their individual rights to freedom of association.17 Of course,
I have assumed that a set of individuals can fulfill their samaritan duties only by acting
collectively, and that doing so (or being willing and able to do so) constitutes a necessary
condition for justifiable secession. It is therefore true, if potentially misleading, to say
that since only a group can perform the necessary political tasks, only a group can
exercise a right to secession. Nevertheless, the denial of secession to a qualified group
wrongs the individuals who constitute it, because it is they who are denied the
opportunity to perform these tasks with others who are willing and able to act collectively
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with them, and only with them.18 These individuals enjoy a right to freedom of
association, grounded in their status as autonomous creatures, and that right includes a
(defeasible) claim against others that they not be compelled to associate with them.
When a qualified group is not permitted to secede, or colonized, or forcibly annexed, its
individual members are denied their right not to associate with those who are members of
the ruling, annexing, or colonizing state.
It may seem odd to claim that individuals have a right (the right to freedom of
association) that they may exercise in certain ways (to secede) only if enough other
individuals also choose to exercise that right in the same way. Perhaps it would be better
to conclude, as Wellman does, that since morally justifiable secession can only be carried
out by a collection of individuals intentionally acting in concert with one another to
achieve a shared goal, that the right to secession is held by the group, rather than its
individual members. Upon reflection, however, it may not seem so strange to claim that
in some cases an individual can exercise her right to freedom of association only if
certain others do so as well. For example, suppose I want to form a group to discuss
Russian literature, but can find no one else who wishes to do so. Surely this does not
entail that the right to discuss Russian literature can be held only by a group, even though
successfully creating and maintaining such a discussion requires that two or more
individuals collaborate in pursuit of this shared goal. Were a discussion group to form,
and then be suppressed by the state, the wrong would be done to the individuals whose
freedom to associate with one another for the purposes of discussing Russian literature
the state denied. Legally it might make sense to describe the conflict as one between the
state and the Russian discussion group (as opposed to, or at least in addition to, the
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individuals who currently constitute it), since a victory for the latter would establish that
any future member of the group, and not just those who currently belong to it, enjoy a
right to meet and discuss Russian literature. This does not change the fact that the
group’s moral rights, and the wrongs done to its members when those rights are violated,
can and should be accounted for solely in terms of the individual moral right to freedom
of association.19
Someone might object that in the Russian literature example, the inability of an
individual to exercise his right to freedom of association in a certain way without others
doing likewise follows from the impossibility of a discussion group with only one
member. In contrast, the barrier to secession for a person who cannot convince enough
others to join him is not that doing so is impossible, but rather as I argue below, that
doing so is morally prohibited. It is not clear why this difference should weaken the
analogical argument for the claim that in some cases, including secession, an individual
can exercise her right to freedom of association only if certain others do so as well. All
that matters is that there be a good reason why an individual’s exercise of her right to
freedom of association is conditional in this way, and both (metaphysical? logical?)
impossibility and true moral prohibitions provide such a reason.
The Russian literature example is intended to make the case for the possibility of
an individual right that agents can exercise only in concert with one another; that is, as a
group. A critic might employ it for a different purpose, however; namely, to call into
question the sufficiency of an appeal to the right to freedom of association as an
explanation for the wrong done to a qualified group denied the opportunity to secede.20
Suppose the state permits those who wish to discuss Russian literature to meet with one
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another, but then prevents them from carrying on any conversation on that subject. If the
state acts wrongly here, as most will agree it does, that cannot be because it denies these
agents their right to freedom of association since, by hypothesis, they are free to meet
with one another. Rather, the wrong must involve the violation of some other right, such
as the right to freedom of speech. Similarly, when an existing state denies a qualified
group living within its territory the opportunity to secede, it need not be denying
members of that group their individual rights to freedom of association. Instead, it may
be denying them certain other rights, such as the right to educate their children in a way
disapproved of by the majority in the existing state.21
This criticism conceives of the right to freedom of association as merely a right to
be in the presence of others, or a right to meet with them in some very minimal sense.
Such a conception strikes me as mistaken, however. Rather, the right to freedom of
association consists in a right to associate with others for a certain purpose (or for many
purposes). Members of the Russian literature group wish to associate with one another
for the purpose of discussing Russian literature. If the state allows them to congregate in
the same room, but prevents them from discussing Russian literature, then it violates their
right to associate for that purpose. The state may also be denying these agents their right
to freedom of speech, though perhaps it need not do so. We can imagine the state
permitting each to speak as he wishes, but making it impossible for the others to hear or
understand them, and it may be that in doing so the state does not violate the Russian
literature group members’ rights to free speech. Regardless, I suggest that a conception
of the right to freedom of association that characterizes it in terms of associating for a
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certain purpose better captures the common understanding of that right than does the thin
notion of free association employed in the foregoing criticism.
Nevertheless, the criticism serves a useful end as it points to the need to say
something about the scope of the right to freedom of association. I contend that all else
equal the only purpose for which people may not associate – or perhaps better, the only
ends people acting in association with one another may not pursue – are those that
involve the violation of others’ basic rights.22 I suspect, though I will not investigate the
matter here, that such an understanding of the scope of the individual right to freedom of
association can be justified by appeal to a variety of liberal theories of justice; for
example, by appeal to Rawls’ first principle of justice (and other theories of justice in the
Kantian tradition), or to A. John Simmons’ conception of people as naturally free and
equal (and other theories of justice in the Lockean tradition).23 Given this conception of
the scope of the right to freedom of association, and so the right not to associate, as long
as the seceding group is willing and able to perform the requisite political functions, and
the remainder group is also able and willing to do so (or at least should be willing to do
so), then by exercising their right not to associate members of the seceding group do not
violate anyone’s basic rights. It follows that secession under these cases falls within the
scope of individuals’ rights to freedom of association.
The understanding of the rights to secession and non-intervention in terms of the
individual right to freedom of association may appear to pose a serious challenge to the
legitimacy of existing states. After all, if the right to freedom of association includes a
right not to associate, then it appears that every individual has a right to secede from the
state that claims to be sovereign over her. Should any individual choose to exercise this
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right, the state would often be morally unjustified in coercing her (or threatening to
coerce her) in order to get her to comply with its demands.24 Moreover, given that
individuals enjoy a right to freedom of association grounded in their status as
autonomous agents, we ought not to assume that a state enjoys legitimacy vis-à-vis its
subjects unless and until they secede, but rather that it can justifiably claim to rule them
only if they freely choose to associate with the state; that is, only if they have consented
to the state’s rule. Since very few individuals have freely consented to rule by an existing
state, the argument from freedom of association gets us a right to secession at the cost of
de-legitimizing all existing states. Some may conclude, therefore, that the proposed
account of the rights to secession (and non-intervention) ought to be rejected.
This line of argument fails because it assumes that the right to freedom of
association is absolute, when in fact that right is limited by those natural duties the
fulfillment of which requires participation in a state. Put a bit simply, morality requires
that every agent contribute his or her fair share to see to it that all enjoy their basic moral
rights (or alternatively, benefit from others’ fulfillment of their samaritan duties). It
follows that individuals have no right to freedom of association in cases where it would
result in either the duties correlative to these rights (or samaritan duties) going
unfulfilled, or an unfair distribution of the burdens involved in fulfilling these duties
amongst all those who have them.25 But while the natural duty to bear one’s fair share of
the burden involved in the fulfillment of samaritan duties requires that every individual
be part of some group willing and able to perform the functions that justify the state, it
leaves it open to individuals to form any size group consistent with the performance by
all of their samaritan duties. Thus the right to freedom of association entails a claim to
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belong to one qualified group rather than another, but it does not include a claim not to
associate with any group willing and able to fulfill the functions that justify the state.
The reader may wonder why the individual right to freedom of association gives
rise (under certain conditions) to a right to secede, and not merely a right to emigrate.
Why does Canada not adequately recognize its subjects’ individual rights to freedom of
association by permitting residents of Quebec who no longer wish to be part of Canadian
society, or forced to associate with non-French speaking Canadians, to leave Canada?
The reason is this. The state’s right to rule over certain people in a certain territory – that
is, its claim to jurisdiction over them – is conditional on its successfully performing those
functions that legitimate the state. Central to those functions, and so the state’s
legitimacy, is that it protect its subjects’ individual rights. Among those rights are the
right to associate with others who are willing and able to act collectively with them, and
only with them, to fulfill their samaritan duties. If a number of individuals make up a
qualified group, and they wish to exercise their right to act with one another, and only
with one another, to fulfill their samaritan duties, then the state that formerly enjoyed
morally justifiable jurisdiction over them no longer does so. This state does not have the
moral standing to demand that the individual members of the qualified group either
recognize its rule or exit from its territory – the territory no longer “belongs” to that state.
So for example, if the people of Quebec constitute a qualified group, and they wish to
secede from Canada, then Canada no longer enjoys morally justifiable jurisdiction over
Quebec.26 Canada has no moral claim to rule over that territory and those who live in it,
and so it has no standing to make the offer “acknowledge my rule or leave this territory
(or my jurisdiction).”27
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Thus far I have argued that the rights to secession and to non-intervention should
be understood as one way in which, under certain conditions, agents may exercise their
individual rights to freedom of association. In the next section, I consider and rebut
Wellman’s attempt to demonstrate that these rights cannot be grounded in individual
autonomy.
III
I have claimed several times that the right to freedom of association is one that
creatures enjoy in virtue of their status as autonomous agents. Wellman argues, however,
that the rights to political self-determination cannot be justified by appeal to individual
autonomy, because the value of group autonomy (at least for political groups) cannot be
accounted for as an extension of individual autonomy. While I reject Wellman’s
approach to justifying secession, etc, by appeal to group autonomy, it will still be useful
to consider his argument, and to explain why it does not affect the account of the rights to
secession and non-intervention I defend.
Wellman claims that group autonomy can only be an extension of individual
autonomy when agents voluntarily choose to join and remain a member of the group. For
example, Wellman argues that compelling Augusta National Golf Club to accept a
woman as a member disrespects the autonomy of the club members.28 It does so because
only they have a right to determine who can or cannot join the club. Since Augusta
National’s origination and continued existence depend upon the voluntary decisions of its
members to create the club and to remain members of it, each of the men who belong to
Augusta National can be understood to freely endorse its secondary rules regarding how
the club’s policies are to be set, and likely many or even all of its primary rules of
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conduct. It is in virtue of this voluntary endorsement that the club’s autonomy can be
understood as an extension of individual autonomy. Though no individual exercises sole
control over the club’s policies, this fact does not undermine the claim that Augusta
National’s (group) autonomy is an extension of its members (individual) autonomy,
because each person is bound by these rules only if he freely joins and chooses to remain
a member of it.29
As Wellman rightly points out, few people voluntarily choose to associate with
the state that claims them as subjects. This raises two difficulties for the attempt to
account for the value of a political group’s autonomy in terms of the value of its
members’ individual autonomy. First, if the members of a group have not freely chosen
to act in concert with one another, then we cannot appeal to the need to respect people’s
autonomous choices as an explanation for why we ought to respect the group’s exercise
of rights to political self-determination. Since states “non-consensually coerce all those
over whom they exercise sovereignty,” it follows that we cannot appeal to the individual
subjects’ autonomous choice to act in concert with one another to explain why
colonization, forced annexation, or the denial of secession to a qualified group is wrong.30
Second, as the argument in the preceding paragraph demonstrates, voluntary endorsement
of a group’s policies is essential for establishing an understanding of a group’s autonomy
as an extension of its individual members’ autonomy. Absent such an endorsement,
which requires at least a right to exit at reasonable cost, and perhaps also that
membership in the group arise originally from a free and informed choice, we cannot
understand the state’s autonomy as an extension of its subjects’ autonomy. Since
Wellman believes that the defense of deontological rights to political self-determination,
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such as the right to secession, require an account of group autonomy, he concludes that
these rights cannot be derived from respect for individual autonomy.
Does either, or both, of these objections undermine the case for understanding the
rights to secession and to non-intervention in terms of respect for individuals’ exercise of
their right to freedom of association? Consider the first of these – that when membership
in a group results from coercion, denial of the group’s rights to secession and nonintervention cannot be understood as the denial of individual’s autonomous choice, since
no choice was made to join the group. Yet even if membership in group A is nonvoluntary, it seems that its members can still justifiably object to being compelled to
become members of group B (as in a case of forced annexation). This is so even if some
subset of the members of group A can also justifiably object to being compelled to
remain members of group A. To take a concrete example, suppose that the residents of
Quebec constitute a qualified group, and that the vast majority of these residents did not
voluntarily choose to become either Quebecois or Canadians. Were the United States to
forcibly annex all of Canada, the Quebecois would have a justifiable complaint against
them; the United States would have violated their right to associate only with one
another. This is so even if Canada had also violated this same right, by refusing to allow
the Quebecois to secede. Indeed, the only point at which a group of people cannot
justifiably complain about being non-voluntarily compelled to associate with certain
others is if they do not count as a qualified group.31 The non-voluntary origins of a
person’s membership in a given state do not conflict with respect for that person’s
autonomy, since as I argued above, all agents have a natural moral duty to participate in
some state or other.32 However, denial of a qualified group’s right to secession does
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constitute disrespect for its members’ individual autonomy. In short, the refusal to allow
a group to secede violates the members’ individual rights to freedom of association, even
if their membership in the original group (or in the newly created state) is non-voluntary,
unless that group is not a qualified one.33
Wellman’s second objection to a justification of the political rights to selfdetermination in terms of respect for individual autonomy rests on a conception of
autonomy as active self-government. Some theorists argue that democracy has noninstrumental value because it is the only form of government in which the people rule
themselves.34 But Wellman notes Allen Buchanan’s observation that subjects of a
democratic state do not rule themselves, but are instead ruled by the majority.35 Even a
person who votes with the majority does not rule herself, since it is in virtue of the fact
that the majority favors a certain outcome, policy, or rule, and not the fact that she favors
it, that renders the agent subject to it. Thus government by majority rule excludes active
self-determination, unless members of the group so governed can freely exit it should
they disapprove of the decisions made by the majority.36 Wellman calls attention to the
incompatibility of democracy and individual self-government in order to buttress the
claim that we ought to endorse the idea of group autonomy even if we cannot (yet)
provide a convincing explanation of its value, because doing so is necessary to provide a
deontological account of the right to democratic governance. But this incompatibility has
implications as well for the attempt to justify a right to secession by appeal to individual
autonomy. Wellman defends, and I also endorse, a plebiscitary right to secession. That
is, a decision regarding whether to secede involves a majority rule decision procedure in
which all competent persons living in the territory over which the new state would rule
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exercise an equal vote.37 It follows that a qualified group’s exercise of the right to
secession cannot be understood in terms of individual autonomous choice, since it is the
majority, rather than any individual, who exercises it. As indicated above, this is so
regardless of whether an individual casts her vote in favor of, or against, secession.
It appears, therefore, that a successful defense of a plebiscitary right to secession
grounded in the individual right to freedom of association requires that democratic
governance be reconciled with respect for individual autonomy. In the next section, I
describe one way in which such a reconciliation might be carried out.
IV
The first step to resolving the apparent conflict between democracy and individual
autonomy involves the substitution of a Kantian conception of autonomy for a Lockean
one. The latter emphasizes the idea of active self-government, and posits that individuals
are bound only by a (usually) minimal number of natural duties to others, and whatever
transactional obligations they may acquire (e.g. promissory obligations or duties of
gratitude). A Kantian, in contrast, does not treat autonomy as fundamentally a kind of
activity, but rather as a status that certain creatures enjoy.38 For example, on a
contractualist version of the Kantian conception of autonomy, respect for persons as
autonomous agents requires that they be treated only in ways that, as rational and
reasonable creatures, they could not reject. Here the term ‘rational’ refers to the power
an agent has to organize his own life, a task that includes the evaluation of ends as well as
the means to them. To be rational in this sense is to be capable of forming and acting on
a conception of the good. By ‘reasonable’ I mean a fundamental commitment to limiting
the pursuit of the good life (i.e. some particular conception of the good) when and as
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necessary to accommodate others who are also rational and reasonable, that is, who also
pursue a conception of the good life but are committed to limiting that pursuit in order to
accommodate others with the same two basic commitments.39 To act only on principles
(or for reasons) that others could not reasonably reject, to constrain in this manner one’s
pursuit of a particular conception of the good life, is simply to recognize other agents as
self-governing, as creatures whose actions can be justifiably limited only in ways that, if
they were reasonable, they would limit it in order to respect other agents’ autonomy. As
T.M. Scanlon puts the point, “by accepting the requirement that [rational and reasonable
creatures] should be treated only in ways allowed by principles that they could not
reasonably reject, we acknowledge their status as self-governing beings, not just things
that can be harmed or benefited.”40
Someone might object that to treat someone in accordance with principles they
would not reject were they rational and reasonable cannot constitute respect for them as
self-governing creatures, since it may sometimes require treating them in ways to which
they have not consented, and would not in fact choose to be treated. Yet the same is true
on the Lockean conception of autonomy; agents may not commit certain acts, regardless
of whether they have voluntarily agreed to refrain from doing so. Moreover, on the
Kantian conception, respect for others as autonomous agents does entail duties to refrain
from interfering with individual’s actual choices in a wide range of situations; indeed, it
may also justify duties to promote others’ development of those abilities and skills
involved in actual decision-making, and to assist them in the exercise thereof.41 Thus the
Kantian can recognize the importance of actual self-governance, that is, an individual’s
actual exercise of choice and normative authority over various aspects of her life. But
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because the Kantian does not equate actual self-governance with autonomy, but rather
with treating others in ways that they would not reject if they were rational and
reasonable, it remains open to him or her to justify a right to democratic governance as a
necessary element of respect for (most) people’s status as autonomous agents.
I have said more (though perhaps not enough) about this contractualist version of
Kantian autonomy elsewhere, and argued on the basis of it for an individual right to
democratic governance.42 Here I present only a brief summary of those arguments,
noting in particular those elements that can be drawn on to rebut the objections Wellman
raises to Allen Buchanan’s attempt to justify an individual right to democratic
governance, albeit on different grounds than those I employ.
Suppose that, as I have assumed throughout this paper, respect for others’ basic
moral rights (i.e. respect for them as autonomous agents) requires collective action, and
that states can, and often do, play a necessary role in facilitating it. Their primary means
for doing so is via the enactment, application, and enforcement of laws. Yet even wellintentioned agents will often reasonably disagree as to the form that morally necessary
collective action ought to take; that is, over what the laws ought to be. Here the term
‘reasonable’ refers not to the moral power discussed above (moral reasonableness), but
rather to judgments made in circumstances characterized by what Rawls labels the
burdens of judgment (cognitive reasonableness).43 I offer two arguments intended to
demonstrate that in such circumstances, respect for others’ status as autonomous agents
requires that the resolution of these disagreements ought to be made democratically.
Every agent has two reasons to bring about a state of affairs in which he or she
alone exercises the authority to settle the form that morally necessary collective action
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ought to take. First, if the agent thinks that, morally, everyone ought to do X, then she is
rationally committed to the claim that the disagreement should be resolved in favor of
everyone doing X. The best and only way to ensure such a result is for the agent to
exercise dictatorial authority. Second, every agent has a reason to promote a state of
affairs in which she never needs to act contrary to what she believes morality requires in
order to act legally. Obviously it is not possible for each member of the state to act
simultaneously on these reasons. Moreover, no member can offer these reasons as a
justification for exercising total authority over the content of the law, since every other
member has the same reasons for claiming this authority. Resolution of this impasse
requires a principle that assigns equal weight to each person having the same reasons for
wanting to exercise the authority in question. The two salient options are a principle of
equal chances, as in the form of a fair lottery for selecting who should be dictator, and a
principle of equal division, as in the case of a majority rule vote. I offer two reasons in
favor of the latter over the former. First, only in a majority rule vote does every person
exercise (or at least have a right to exercise) authority over the form that morally
necessary collective action ought to take; indeed, each exercises the greatest authority
possible consistent with a like authority for all of the other participants.44 Second, a fair
lottery is less likely to reflect the preferences of a majority than will a majority rule vote,
and so is more likely to lead to disobedience and deliberate efforts to undermine the
effective and/or efficient operation of the morally necessary collective action scheme (i.e.
the legal order). If this hypothesis is correct, and given the moral necessity of collective
action, it follows that rational and reasonable agents can offer this practical consideration
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as a reason to reject a fair lottery in favor of a majority rule vote. It follows, on
contractualist grounds, that individual’s have a right to democratic governance.45
A second argument in favor of the individual right to democratic governance rests
on the intuition that, in circumstances characterized by cognitively reasonable
disagreement, treating others morally requires equal respect for each agent’s exercise of
his or her moral judgment. I suspect that many people would agree that assigning less
weight to one citizen’s judgment regarding what the law ought to be than is accorded to
other citizens’ judgments denigrates or degrades that individual.46 As Jeremy Waldron
writes,
because A has a sense of justice, A may think of himself as having what it
takes to participate in decisions where others’ rights are also involved [in
addition to his own.]. If A is nevertheless excluded from the decision . . .
A will feel slighted: he will feel that his own sense of justice has been
denigrated as inadequate to the task of deciding not only something
important, but something important in which he, A, has a stake as well as
others.47
Of course, the duty to respect others’ exercise of moral judgment is not absolute; if an
agent’s judgments are cognitively unreasonable – that is, not intelligible even in light of
the burdens of judgment – then no disrespect is done to him or her when these judgments
are disregarded. I argue that in practice, this implies that basic moral rights limit the
scope of democratic authority (as well as individual’s liberty and authority).48 In sum,
the individual right to democratic governance rests on the following two claims: first,
each participant in a morally necessary collective action scheme (such as the state) has
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the same claim to the authority to determine the form such action ought to take (i.e. what
the law ought to be), a claim that is better accommodated by democracy than by a fair
lottery; and second, each individual’s exercise of moral judgment regarding the form
morally necessary collective action ought take should be given the same weight, as long
as that judgment is cognitively reasonable.
Wellman attempts to defend the plausibility of group autonomy in part by
demonstrating that only it can provide a justification for a deontological right to
democratic governance. It should be clear from the earlier discussion why this right
cannot be understood in terms of individual autonomy, understood in Lockean terms as
active self-government. But Wellman also criticizes Allen Buchanan’s claim that the
right to democratic governance follows from a principle of fundamental equality.49 Such
an argument faces (at least) two difficulties, according to Wellman. First, it cannot
explain why political authority should not be distributed via a fair lottery. A fundamental
principle of equality does not uniquely justify democracy; rather, it justifies a disjunctive
right to either democracy or what Wellman calls an egalitarian monarchy (i.e. a lottery in
which each person has an equal chance of being crowned absolute monarch). For the
reasons I briefly outlined above, my own account of the individual right to democratic
governance is not vulnerable to this objection. Second, Wellman claims that Buchanan’s
egalitarian argument implies that all members of the state must possess equal political
power, so that the individual right to democracy entails the moral necessity of direct
democracy. Such an implication will likely strike many as troubling, not only because
the implementation of direct democracy as the sole method of government appears
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unrealizable in the modern world, but also because many think representative democracy
compatible with fundamental equality.
Though my own account of the right to democratic governance does not rest on
equality – rather, equal treatment results from respect for each individual’s right – it
appears to be just as vulnerable to Wellman’s second objection. In response, I contend
that the right to democratic governance involves only a claim to a minimally democratic
state. Such a state is one in which the norms that structure political decision-making (i.e.
constitutional norms) include procedures by which those norms (and so any acts they
legitimate) may be revised, and those procedures must take the form of a majority rule
vote, in which each person subject to the political authority in question may participate
equally. That is, while decisions regarding the basic structure or constitution of the state
must be arrived at through (and be open to change by) a process of direct democracy, it
does not violate any agent’s right to democratic governance if the product of such a
process is government via some combination of a representative legislature, a supreme
court with the powers of judicial review, and so on.50 In short, though my account of the
individual right to democratic authority does entail that all members of the state should
exercise equal political power with respect to that state’s constitution, it does not require
that they exercise an equal say in every political decision.
The foregoing attempt to reconcile a non-direct democratic state with the
individual right to democratic governance may strike some as problematic. However, its
attractiveness may be enhanced, at least vis-à-vis Wellman’s account of the right to
democracy, by considering a troubling implication of the latter. Wellman argues that
though democratic decision making is not compatible with a Lockean conception of
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individual autonomy, it can be explained in terms of group autonomy: the denial of
democratic governance to a group constitutes a failure to properly acknowledge the value
of the group’s autonomy, or in other words, to respect the group’s self-determination.
This justification for the right to democratic governance faces a serious difficulty,
however, even apart from the lack of a convincing account of the value of group
autonomy. For suppose that a sufficient number of group members prefer a nondemocratic form of government – say, an egalitarian monarchy. It seems that Wellman’s
argument entails the justifiability of such a change in the form group governance takes.
The minority of group members who would prefer a democratic form of government are
not wronged when they are denied it, since the group’s right to self-determination has not
been violated. Wellman might claim that the minority is wrongfully disrespected, even
though their autonomy is not violated and they are not treated unequally. But as I
demonstrated in the first section of this paper, Wellman fails to provide a compelling
account of the nature of this disrespect. Wellman does write that “our basic rights place
limits upon democracy’s sphere; we would never allow a majority to vote to enslave or
disenfranchise a minority, for instance.51 But on what grounds does Wellman think that
individuals have a basic right to democratic participation? And why won’t whatever
grounds he provides suffice as a justification for the right to democratic governance,
thereby eliminating the need to appeal to group autonomy to provide such a justification?
Even if Wellman can appeal to the fundamental equality of persons to explain why a
majority may not disenfranchise a minority, he cannot offer the same reason to explain
why a majority cannot opt to replace a democratic form of government with an
egalitarian monarchy. Of course, Wellman could simply accept this implication of his
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account, but I suspect that many of those who share Wellman’s deontological intuitions
with respect to democratic governance will find it very troubling.
In contrast, on my account of the right to democratic governance, nothing short of
a unanimous waiver of the right to an equal say in determining the basic structure of the
state can justify a non-democratic form of government. Even in this case, the voluntary
waiver of each person who subsequently joins the community (through immigration or
coming of age) would be required to justify the continuation of non-democratic rule.
Since the right to democratic governance is a basic moral right held by all competent
members of the state, the majority’s decision to replace their democratic government with
an egalitarian monarchy would violate the rights of the minority who had not waived this
right. Just as a majority is not empowered to waive or surrender every citizens’ rights to
freedom of association or freedom of conscience, so too it lacks the moral authority to
waive or surrender their right to democratic governance.52 In sum, Wellman’s appeal to
group autonomy or self-determination cannot explain why political communities must be
ruled democratically, while my defense of the right to democratic governance on the
basis of respect for creatures’ status as autonomous agents does so.
If successful, the defense of the right to democratic governance grounded in
respect for individuals’ status as autonomous agents completes the development of a
plausible (and hopefully compelling) alternative to Wellman’s attempt to justify
deontological moral rights to political self-determination by appeal to the value of group
autonomy.
I would like to thank Colleen Murphy and Kit Wellman for their comments on an earlier
version of this paper.
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